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美国的“中国问题”

作者:于滨/文 韩雪/译   来源:外交观察网发布时间:2015/07/10
摘要:中国和美国不需要彼此相爱。但如果不能理解彼此的核心利益和战略文化,将会导致双边关系陷于困境。

  一个幽灵正在美国上空徘徊——一个稳步崛起的中国幽灵,正在挑战二战后建立的由美国主导的国际经济秩序和安全体系。

  截至2015年3月底,世界各地57个国家作为意向创始成员国(PFM)加入了中国倡议设立的亚洲基础设施投资银行(AIIB)。几乎所有中国的邻国都签约亚投行,这包括东盟10国和上合组织的所有成员国。在国际层面,20国集团的中的14名成员和所有新兴经济体金砖国家(巴西,俄罗斯,印度和南非)都加盟其中。G7集团中的欧洲国家(英国,法国,德国和意大利)和欧盟28个成员国中的半数国家也不顾美国的反对而加入亚投行。此时此刻,美国几乎成了孤家寡人。就连带头在中国南海争端中反对中国的菲律宾,也公开撤出了美国主导、排除中国的泛太平洋战略经济伙伴关系协议(TPP)的谈判,并签署了AIIB。

  然而亚投行的余波未平,南中国海问题又接踵而来。整个4月和5月,因为中国在南海争议区造岛活动,华盛顿城中"惩罚中国"之声甚嚣尘上,放言要派遣美国军机和舰船维护美国在该区域的航行自由。1美国国务卿约翰·克里五月中旬访问北京时承诺,美国政府在南中国海领土争端问题上不设立场。2然而克里刚刚离开北京,美国海军P8A侦察机就搭载CNN摄制组飞临南海的中国岛礁,大张旗鼓地表示美国反对中国在该地区的行动。3

  6月初,美国总统奥巴马也加入了这个危言耸听的合唱团,他指责中国不应该"对别国拳脚相向,扫地出门"。4其实奥巴马这样说还算对中国客气了,此后美国上下左右都在炒作中国间谍渗透美国,并对美国进行网络攻击的传闻。菲律宾总统阿基诺更是赤膊上阵,把中国在南中国海的做法与二战爆发前纳粹德国兼并捷克斯洛伐克的苏台德区相提并论。5与此同时,日本也跃跃欲试。1945年8月,日本在向盟军投降后被迫撤出南中国海地区。70年后,日本强大的海军将再次返回南海。

  中国式的大国崛起

  然而,美国反对亚投行和中国在南海的造岛活动不仅是错误的,而且还凸显了在对中国的战略文化和历史轨迹的理解中存在的巨大盲点。

  在亚投行一事中,中国无意挑战美国主导的国际经济体系,这仅仅是对国际货币基金组织改革停滞不前做出的反应,2010年,国际货币基金组织曾经做出承诺,要给中国和其他新兴经济体更多的投票权,但因美国国会的反对而被推迟。中国主办亚投行,也是由于亚洲有巨大的基础设施需求(高达8万亿美元),而美国和日本主导的全球金融机构,如国际货币基金组织和亚洲开发银行,对如此巨量的需求却一直鲜有作为。6

  除了亚投行,中国的崛起首先是一种经济现象。在过去的35年里,中国的GDP平均每年以10%的速度增长,使超过5亿人摆脱了贫困。7在2013年,中国以4.15万亿美元的总贸易额成为世界上最大的贸易国。8一年后,按照购买力平价计算GDP,中国则超过美国,成为世界最大经济体(17.6万亿美元对美国的17.5亿美元)。9

  中国的稳步崛起不仅表现在卓越的经济成就,而且也对国际体系的运作产生巨大的影响。与西方崛起时把自己凌驾于世界之上和无休止地发动战争不同的是,中国在崛起时奉行的是和平发展战略,这在世界史无前例,特别是在大规模杀伤性武器的时代。基于此种战略,中国迄今为止在其领土之外没有军事基地,除执行联合国授权的任务以外,中国在别国没有武装人员,在其他国家的土地上没有部署核武器,而且中国是唯一正式承诺"不首先使用核武器"的核武器国家。在核武器超杀伤力极不对称的世界里,其他核武国家都奉行先发制人和首先使用核武的战略,其核武器也处于高度的待发态势。相比之下,中国不首先使用核武的战略最不具挑衅性,同时也是通向消减核武和核裁军之道的捷径。

  不言而喻,中国的崛起确实终结了西方(和日本)对中国的统治。但它没有,将来也不会终结西方本身。事实上,大多数中国人都认为,一个包括美国在内的强大、稳定、自信的西方更符合中国的利益,因为中国的福祉有赖于一个和平与繁荣的世界。中国目前的外交政策的一个更深层次的哲学基础可以上溯到"和而不同"的儒家观念,这意味着中国将与他者共存,而非主导他者,尤其是那些有着不同的文化、历史、政治和经济背景的国家和民族。但西方对中国却未必能够如此。美国热衷于以非友即敌的方式分化世界,她能否愿意而且有能力接受一个非西方的、非西式民主的、非基督教的、非白人的中国?人们还要拭目以待。

  南海问题的历史坐标

  鉴于中国崛起的特性和历史,在此多国声索主权的高敏感地区,美国选边站队和强势的介入南海争端不仅是不明智的,而且是危险的。不管有意还是无意,美国政府无视中国已经成功地解决了和几乎所有邻国的边界纠纷,包括与越南在陆地和海洋(北部湾)的划界。唯一剩下的边界争端是沿中印边境的两个地段,而这两个地段,自从超过半世纪以前(1962年)的短暂的边界战争后,也得到了有效管控。

  对于所有的针对南海问题的炒作,历史似乎站在中国一边。而美国政府也知道这一点。6月1日,奥巴马总统本人也承认了这一点,他说,一些中国的主权声索可能是合法的。10美方也有资料显示,中国政府——从19世纪的清朝到20世纪的上半叶的民国政府——多次宣称其拥有南海地区的主权。在1884年至1885年中法战争中,中国正式反对法国将南海诸岛划归到法国殖民印度支那的企图。1932年法国正式宣称拥有西沙群岛和南沙群岛主权时,中国再次提出抗议。 1945年中国从欧洲列强和日本人手中夺回这此岛屿时,得到了美方及时而重要的帮助,美国根据开罗和波茨坦宣言,协助中华民国军队接受在台湾,包括西沙群岛和南沙群岛的日军投降。

  中国维护其南海主权的记录源远流长。相比之下,其他周边国家,如菲律宾和越南的声索都起步很晚,且前后矛盾。西班牙和美国殖民菲律宾四个世纪之久(1543年至1946年),但从来没有包括南沙群岛。1956年北越正式接受了西沙群岛和南沙群岛历来都是中国领土的主张。而菲律宾直到1972年才第一次提出对南沙群岛的主权要求。11

  尽管有最长的主权声索历史纪录,但中国在南沙群岛实际占有岛礁量却最少(只有8个,而越南占了29个,菲律宾占了9个),中国是最后一个在南沙群岛构建跑道等大型设施的国家(越南自2011年在其占领的岛礁建成1万平方米的设施)。12中国也没有诉诸武力从其他声索国手中夺回南沙岛礁,而是来建设自己实际占领的岛礁。

  中国在南海的造岛活动是也是针对2009年以来南海争端逐渐"国际化"的反应,2010年7月国务卿希拉里·克林顿在东盟地区论坛(ARF)的一次演讲中宣布,维护在南海的海上航行自由事关美国国家利益。同时,美国明确表示,其重点将是致力于有关南海问题的多边谈判。然而,美国的这些动作未使中国完全放弃与其他南海声索国双边会谈的一贯主张。2011年10月11日,中越两国签署了《关于指导解决中越两国海上问题基本原则协议》。13放眼未来,中国不会轻易放弃标志着中国对整个南海的主张的"九段线",这是中华民国政府在1947年正式提出的,也仍然是台湾的官方政策。除此之外,中国将继续遵循其长期奉行的与其他声索国在争议海域"搁置争议,共同开发"的原则,这是由已故中国领导人邓小平在1978年正式阐述的政策。14

  由于中国的克制,航行自由从来没有在南海成为问题。原因很简单:作为世界上最大的贸易国,中国对干扰南海的商业航运或空运,比之其他国家都没有兴趣。美国政府坚持要求自己的自由航行权(必要时借助武力),但这不是联合国海洋法公约(UNCLOS)的组成部分,还会把南海争端推入未知水域。

  究竟中国将如何使用在南海的岛礁,还有待观察。然而,历史表明,当中国在1600年至1800年间是世界超级强国之时,却选择了止步于东亚。15世纪郑和率领中国舰队在公海雄霸天下之时,他们载着瓷器、丝绸和其他产品以及善意抵达遥远的国度,但从未试图去"发现"那些地方,就像那里从来没有过人迹。直到今天,大多数中国人仍不明白,自18世纪以来,崛起的西方为何不像中国做的那样留恋故土。

  两个支点的故事

  回到21世纪,亚投行和南海问题象征着两种截然不同类型的国家战略。在过去的35年中,稳步崛起的中国已经将重心转向世界范围的贸易、投资、基础设施建设和跨文化交流。习近平主席在2013年发起的中国的"一带一路"战略("丝绸之路经济带"和 "海上丝绸之路")的目标是整合整个欧亚大陆及以外的经济。

  与此相反,美国已经铁了心要谋求自身的绝对安全、全方位军事优势,15以及核优势地位。16自从冷战结束,天下无敌的美军在单极世界中我行我素,无所顾忌。但是,当美军的重心转到阿拉伯 - 伊斯兰世界的许多地方时,留下的却是血腥的战争,无尽的苦难,和充斥着极端势力的(像伊斯兰国)的失败国家。相比之下,尽管亚太地区幅员广阔,多样复杂,且缺乏一个综合的安全框架,但它仍然是世界上唯一没有任何内部或国家之间重大冲突的区域。随着美国的直接干预,或者说"支点"转移至南海争端,亚洲的平静会由此逆转吗?

  不管怎样,美中关系仍在未定之天。为维护未来几十年稳定和可持续的双边关系,双方都需要耐心和智慧。中国和美国不需要彼此相爱。但如果不能理解彼此的核心利益和战略文化,将会导致双边关系陷于困境。

——————————————————————

  1 Josh Rogin, “Calls to Punish China Grow,” Bloomberg View, MAY 5, 2015, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-05-05/second-thoughts-on-inviting-china-to-rimpac-naval-exercises.

  2 Suzette Gutierrez, “Kerry Says U.S. Concerned About China's South Sea Actions, China Says it's 'Unshakeable' Regarding Spratly Islands Plan,” HNGN, May 19, 2015, http://www.hngn.com/articles/93145/20150519/kerry-u-s-concerned-chinas-south-sea-actions-china-unshakeable.htm.

  3 Jim Sciutto, “Behind the scenes: A secret Navy flight over China's military buildup,” CNN, May 26, 2015,http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/26/politics/south-china-sea-navy-surveillance-plane-jim-sciutto/index.html.

  4 Reuters, “Obama: Land Reclamation Projects In South China Sea Are 'Counterproductive,” June 1, 2015,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/01/obama-land-reclamation-south-china-sea_n_7487330.html.

  5 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, “President Aquino Should Avoid Inflammatory Rhetoric on South China Sea: China Is Not Nazi Germany! -- The Philippines Has Other Priorities, 6/07/2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jplehmann/2015/06/07/president-aquino-should-shut-up-on-south-china-sea-china-is-not-nazi-germany-the-philippines-has-other-priorities/

  6 Cary Huang, “China frustrated by delayed reforms to increase its say at IMF: Central bank chief says alternative to the 2010 plan may be solution to impasse,” South China Morning Post, April 20, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1771630/china-frustrated-delayed-reforms-increase-its-say-imf.

  7 “China Overview,” The World Bank, March 25, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview.

  8 “WTO’s Secretariat report,” inTrade Policy Review: China, July 2014, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s300_sum_e.pdf.

  9 “Investing in the #1 Economy, China,” The Huffington Post, June 4, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/natalie-pace/investing-in-the-1-econom_b_7495610.html.

  10 Reuters, “Obama: Land Reclamation Projects In South China Sea Are 'Counterproductive,” June 1, 2015,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/01/obama-land-reclamation-south-china-sea_n_7487330.html.

  11 Chas Freeman, “Diplomacy on the Rocks: China and Other Claimants in the South China Sea,” April 10, 2015,http://chasfreeman.net/diplomacy-on-the-rocks-china-and-other-claimants-in-the-south-china-sea/.

  12 Editorial, “Who is throwing elbow in SCS [社评:中美究竟谁在南海推胳膊肘]”, Global Times[环球时报], June 3, 2015, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2015-06/6583437.html;Shi Yang [施洋], “Weekly Military Observation [一周军事观察],”Observer Net, http://www.guancha.cn/ShiYang/2015_06_14_323272_s.shtml.

  13http://baike.baidu.com/view/6120779.htm#reference-[2]-6202144-wrap.

  14http://baike.baidu.com/view/6120779.htm#reference-[2]-6202144-wrap.

  15Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Full-spectrum_dominance#US_military_doctrine.

  16Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2006-03-01/rise-us-nuclear-primacy.

        原文首发于www.lobelog.com,该网站以美国著名非主流记者Jim Lobe 命名,发表次日被《亚洲时报》转载,中文版本略有改动。

        原文网址:http://www.lobelog.com/americas-china-problem/
        《亚洲时报》英文版: http://atimes.com/2015/06/americas-china-problem/ 

        附原文:

America’s China Problem

by Yu Bin

A specter is haunting the U.S.—a specter of a steadily rising China challenging the US-dominated international economic and security system created 70 years ago at the end of World War II.

At the end of March, 57 nations around the world joined the- China-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as its Prospective Founding Member (PFM). Almost all of China’s neighbors signed up, including all 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and all of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Around the world, 14 members of the G20 group and all of the BRICS nations of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa) were on board. Washington was virtually isolated when the G7 European nations (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) and half of the 28-member European Union rushed in, despite US opposition. The Philippines, which is leading the anti-China crusade in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute, publicly withdrew itself from the US-led and China-excluded talks for the Trans Pacific Trade (TPP) and signed up for AIIB.

No sooner had the AIIB closed its door for PFM than the South China Sea (SCS) issue flared up. Throughout April and May, calls were growing louder inside the Beltway to “punish China” for its island building activities in the disputed SCS and to assert the U.S. freedom of navigation (FON) in the region with US military aircraft and ships. Immediately after US Secretary of State John Kerry’s mid-May visit to Beijing, where he promised the host that Washington was “not taking position on the territorial dispute,” a U.S. Navy P8-A surveillance plane was flying close to several China-held reefs in the SCS, with a CNN camera crew on-board to dramatize the U.S. opposition to China’s operations in the area.

In early June, President Obama joined the choir of alarmists by blaming China for “throwing elbows and pushing people out of the way.” This rather moderate criticism of China, however, was more than offset by the widely publicized U.S. accusation of Chinese spying and cyber-attacks. Philippine President Aquino went as far as to compare China’s stance in the SCS to that of Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia before the outbreak of World War II. Meanwhile, Japan is poised to dispatch its powerful navy to the SCS 70 years after it was forced to withdraw on surrendering to the Allies in August 1945. Welcome to the brave new world of speaking loudly and nastily against China while carrying a big stick.

Rise of a Different Power

The U.S. opposition to AIIB and China’s land activities in the SCS, however, is not only misguided, but also demonstrates huge blind spots in the U.S. understanding of China’s strategic culture and historical trajectory.

In the case of the AIIB, China has no intention of challenging the U.S.-dominated international economic system but is reacting to the promised but stalled reform of the IMF to give China and other emerging economies more voting rights, which was proposed in 2010 but has been delayed by the US Congress. China accounts for 17% of global GDP but has only 3.8% of the IMF vote. China’s sponsorship of the AIIB is also driven by the huge infrastructure needs in Asia (up to $8 trillion), which have not been sufficiently addressed by the U.S. and Japan-dominated global financial institutions such as the IMF and Asian Development Bank.

Beyond the AIIB, the rise of China is first and foremost an economic phenomenon. In the past 35 years, China’s GDP growth averages 10% a year, lifting more than 500 million people out of poverty. In 2013, China became the world’s largest trading state with a total trade volume of $4.15 trillion. A year later, China outpaced the United States to become the world’s largest economy in PPP terms ($17.63 trillion verses $17.5 trillion for the U.S.).

The steady rise of China is not only remarkable in economic terms but also has huge implications for the operation of the international system. Instead of imposing itself on the rest of the world and waging endless wars when the West was rising, China’s rise, which is driven by its strategy of peaceful development, is unprecedented in world history, particularly in an age of weapons of mass destruction. In so doing, China so far has no military bases outside its territory, no armed personnel other than those on UN-authorized missions, not a single piece of nuclear weaponry deployed on other countries’ soil, and is the only nuclear-weapon state officially adopting a “no first use” (NFU) policy. In an asymmetrical world of nuclear over-kill capacity, preemption, nuclear first use and trigger-hair alert deployment posture, China’s NFU is the least provocative and represents the shortest distance to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament.

That said, although China’s rise did end the West’s (and Japan’s) domination of China, it does not—and will not—end the West itself. Indeed, most Chinese believe that a strong, stable, and self-confident West, including the United States, is in the interests of China because its wellbeing depends on a peaceful and prosperous world. A deeper philosophical underpinning of China’s current foreign policy can be traced to the Confucian notion of “harmony of differences,” which means that China would live with, but not dominate, others, particularly those nations and peoples with different cultural, historical, political, and economic backgrounds. The reverse, however, may not necessarily be true. It remains to be seen if the U.S., which tends to divide world into friends and foes, would be willing and able to live with a non-Western, non-democratic (of Western style), non-Christian, and non-white China.

SCS: It’s Still History, Stupid?

Given the nature and history of China’s rise, the one-sided and forceful injection of the United States into the SCS dispute is not only unwise but also dangerous in this highly sensitive area with overlapping claims. Washington also ignores, deliberately or not, China’s successful settlement of border disputes with almost all of its neighbors, including land and sea demarcations (the Gulf of Tonkin) with Vietnam. The only remaining border disputes are two sections along the Sino-Indian border, which have been effectively managed since a brief border war more than half a century ago (1962).

For all of the SCS hype, history does seem on China’s side. And Washington is aware of this. On June 1, President Obama himself acknowledged it by saying that some of China’s claims may be legitimate. Other U.S. sources also show that Chinese governments—from the Qing Dynasty of the 19th century to the Nationalist Government in the first half of the 20th century—repeatedly asserted its sovereignty over the SCS region. During the 1884–1885 Sino-French war, China formally objected to France’s efforts to incorporate the SCS islands into French colonized Indochina. China protested again in 1932 when France formally claimed both the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China’s effort to retake these islands from the European colonial powers and Japan received timely and vital help in 1945 when the United States—in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations—assisted the armed forces of the Chinese Nationalist government to accept the surrender of the Japanese garrisons in Taiwan, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands.

In comparison to China’s long record of asserting its sovereignty over the SCS, claims by other littoral states such as the Philippines and Vietnam are both late and inconsistent at best. Spain and the United States colonized the Philippines consecutively for four centuries (1543-1946) but never annexed the Spratlys. In 1956 North Vietnam formally accepted that the Paracel and Spratly islands were historically Chinese. The Philippines made its first claims of the Spratlys only in 1972.

Despite its long historical record of sovereignty claims, China physically possesses the fewest islets in the Spratlys (eight compared with 29 by Vietnam and nine by the Philippines) and is the last one to construct runways and other large-scale facilities (Vietnam has constructed 10,000 square meters of facilities in its occupied reefs since 2011). Nor has China resorted to the use of force to retake the reefs in the Spratlys from other claimants but chooses instead to construct those islets it has physically possessed.

China’s land activities in the SCS are also a reaction to a steadily “internationalization” of the SCS dispute since 2009 when the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in a July 2010 speech to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that FON in the SCS was a U.S. national interest. Meanwhile, the U.S. made clear that its priority is for multilateral negotiations regarding the SCS. That, however, has not entirely neutralized China’s long-standing approach of bilateral talks with other SCS claimants. On October 11, 2011, China and Vietnam signed the agreement of “Basic Principles for the Resolution of Maritime Disputes between China and Vietnam.” In the longer run, China would not easily abandon its claim of the entire SCS represented by the “nine-dash line,” which was officially claimed by the Chinese Nationalist government in 1947 and is still Taiwan’s official policy. Beyond that, however, China will continue to follow its long-held policy of “shelving differences and seeking joint exploration” of the disputed maritime areas with other claimants, which was officially articulated by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978.

Largely because of China’s restraint, freedom of navigation has never been an issue in the SCS. The reason is simple: perhaps more than any other nation, China, which is the world’s largest trading state, has no interest in obstructing commercial shipping or flights across the SCS. Washington’s insistence on its own FON (by force if necessary), which is not part of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is pushing the SCS dispute into uncharted waters.

What exactly China will do with those islets in the SCS remains to be seen. History, however, indicates that when China was the strongest power in the world in 1600-1800, it chose to stay in East Asia. When Chinese fleets led by Admiral Zheng He dominated the world’s high seas in the 15th century, they carried porcelain, silk, and other produces as well as goodwill to faraway places, but never attempted to “discover” those places as if nobody lived there. Till today, most of the Chinese do not understand why the rising West since the 18th century did not stay where it was, as China did.

Tale of Two Pivots

Back to the 21st century, the AIIB and SCS issues symbolize two vastly different types of national strategies. In the past 35 years, a steadily rising China has pivoted to the world for trade, investment, infrastructural construction and inter-cultural exchanges. Initiated by President Xi Jinping in 2013, China’s “One Belt One Road” strategy (“Silk Road Economic Belt” and oceangoing “Maritime Silk Road”) aims at integrating the economy of the entire Eurasian continent and beyond.

In contrast, the U.S. has bent to seek its own absolute security, full spectrum dominance, and nuclear primacy. Since the end of the Cold War, the almighty U.S. military—unbalanced and unconstrained in a unipolar world—has pivoted to many parts of the Arab-Islamic world, leaving a trail of bloody wars, untold of human suffering, and failed states now infested with extreme forces such as ISIS. In comparison, the Asia-Pacific region—despite its vastness, diversity, complexity, and lack of an integrated security framework—remains the only region in the world without any major conflict either within or between states. Will this change with direct U.S. intervention in, or “pivot” to, the SCS disputes?

Regardless, U.S. relations with China remain an open-ended issue, which requires patience and wisdom of both sides for a stable and sustainable bilateral relationship for decades to come. China and the U.S. do not need to love each other. Failure to understand each other’s vital interests and strategic culture, however, will lead to outcomes that nobody wants.

Yu Bin is a senior fellow of the Shanghai Association of American Studies.

(本文版权为外交观察网与作者所有,转载本文请保留完整的著者信息,并注明“来源:外交观察网”)

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